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Integrating UML with Service Refinement for
Requirements Modeling and Analysis
Yilong YANG†a), Member, Jing YANG††b), and Xiaoshan LI†c), Nonmembers
SUMMARY Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the de facto stan-
dard for requirements modeling and system design. UML as a visual lan-
guage can tremendously help customers, project managers, and developers
to specify the requirements of a target system. However, UML lacks the
ability to specify the requirements precisely such as the contracts of the
system operation, and verify the consistency and refinement of the require-
ments. These disadvantages result in that the potential faults of software
are hard to be discovered in the early stage of software development pro-
cess, and then requiring to pay much efforts in software testing to find the
bugs. Service refinement is a formal method, which could be a supplement
to enhance the UML. In this paper, we show how to integrate UML with
service refinement to specify requirements, and verify the consistency and
refinements of the requirements through a case study of online shopping
system. Particularly, requirements are modeled through UML diagrams,
which includes a) use case diagram, b) system sequence diagrams and c)
conceptual class diagram. Service refinement enhances the requirements
model by introducing the contracts. Furthermore, the consistency and re-
finements of requirement model can be verified through service refinement.
Our approach demonstrates integrating UML with service refinement can
require fewer efforts to achieve the consistency requirements than only us-
ing UML for requirement modeling.
key words: UML, requirement analysis, service refinement, interface con-
tract, formal methods
1. Introduction
The methodology of software development has been
tremendously evolved from object-oriented, component-
based to service-oriented approach [1]. Those methodolo-
gies are focus on dealing with the complexity of software
[2]. UML can help the developer to handle inherent com-
plexity by modelling and analyzing the functionality of the
target system. Particularly, the developers can use use-case
diagram and system sequence diagrams to specify the re-
quirements model in the procedure of the requirements anal-
ysis, which includes defining the services interface and in-
teraction protocols between the interface and environment.
Furthermore, the domain model of the target system can be
specified by the conceptual class diagram. However, the de-
velopers cannot know the potential issue of the requirements
only depended on those diagrams, because UML cannot
self-verify no bad properties (E.g., dead-lock and live-lock)
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in requirements models, and it does not contain any tech-
niques to verify the correctness of refinements. That will
make an embarrassing situation when several ”un-verified”
requirements models are specified from the different stage
of software development processes, the developers cannot
guarantee that the new requirements model is enhanced
from the previous one, by adding more the functional re-
quirements without introducing any problems. Those disad-
vantages are the motivations of this paper to integrate UML
with formal methods [3–5] to precisely define the require-
ment model, and verify consistency and refinement of the
requirements.
Service refinement is chosen [6] to enhance UML, be-
cause it is a well-designed formal method on the calculus of
contract refinement. It lays the foundation of guard design
and design refinement from Unifying Theories of Program-
ming (UTP) [7], and the refinement of divergence and fail-
ures from Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [8].
It models and verified many large system such as rocket,
high-speed train, aerospace system. However, service re-
finement is not natively designed for object-oriented re-
quirements modeling and analysis. We made some neces-
sary extensions to service refinement before integrating with
UML:
1) service visibility. The scope of visibility is used by UML
to describe whether an operation of the interface is public or
private. Corresponding, we extended the interface of service
refinement with visible scope, which can specify whether
a service is accessible for the outside environment or only
serves as an internal service for other services.
2) divergence by private service. The divergence state de-
fines the system in the unstable state of livelock, in which
the system infinitely invokes internal actions. After extend-
ing service refinement with visible scope, divergence state
is defined as infinitely invoking the private services of the
interface.
3) consistency as deadlock-free and livelock-free. The con-
sistency of service refinement only consider the deadlock.
The extended consistency of contract must be deadlock-free
and livelock-free. That means after any trace, not all ser-
vices including private and public services are refusal to the
environment, and the trace must not contain the infinitely
private service invoking for livelock-free.
4) refinement by hiding private services. The refinement de-
fined that the interface has the same behavioural with envi-
ronment, but has less bad properties such as deadlock and
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livelock. We need hidden the private service to make the re-
finement definition consistent. Therefore, the extended re-
finement is defined as hiding the private services from the
contract, the refined contract has less divergences and fail-
ures.
Contributions Online Shopping System (OSS) is the most
common used and large system in our daily life. We adopt
the case-based approach to present our methods through
OSS case study. In summary, our major contributions are:
1) The extension of service refinement for requirements
modeling and analysis by UML.
2) We illustrate that UML can enhance service refinement to
elicit start-up requirements, which includes the skeleton of
the service interface and domain model through use case di-
agram and interface and conceptual class diagrams, the draft
of protocol and failures of contracts by system sequence di-
agram.
3) Base on the start-up UML requirements, we demonstrate
that service refinement can refine the requirements model
more precisely through specifying the contracts and proto-
cols of requirements mathematically.
4) We demonstrate that service refinement can give system
analysts the directions of refinement, prove the correctness
of refinements and verify the consistency.
5) To demonstrate our approach works, we use the model
checking tool FDR to specify the same contracts of on-
line shopping system, and then verify the deadlock-free and
livelock-free as well as the refinement of the contracts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 is preliminary of service refinement and the exten-
sions. Section 3 presents requirement elicitation by UML.
And then Section 4 shows formal specifications by service
refinement. Section 5 presents refinement of contract and
consistency verification. Finally, section 6 concludes this
paper and discuss the future work.
2. Service Refinement: Preliminary and Extension
For self-contained and completeness of our paper, the brief
introduction and extension of the service refinement [6] are
presented in this section.
2.1 Interface
The interfaces are the access points of the system. An inter-
face is defined as a tuple with a resource declaration sector
and a service declaration sector:
I = (RDec, SDec)
RDec is a set of variables, variable defines as x : T , where
T stands for the type of the variable. SDec is a set of the
services, the service signature m(in : U, out : V) declares
service m holds variables in of type U and variables out of
type V as its input and output parameters of the service re-
spectively.
Extension for Interface
The prefix signature of service indicates the visibility of the
service for the environments. We use the same notation of
interface described in UML. The prefix notation ”+” indi-
cates the service is a public service. The notation prefix ”-”
indicates the service is a private service, which is not visible
for the environment. The prefix set is prefix = {+,−}. E.g, a
public service m describes as +m(in : U, out : V). In default,
the service without a prefix is regarded as a public service.
Semantics of Service
A specification of a service m is a triple (αm, gm, Pm), where
1) αm comprises all the resource managed by the service.
2) gm is the firing condition of the service, characterizing the
circumstance under the service can be activated.
3) Pm is a reactive design, describing the behavior of execu-
tion of service.
2.2 Contract
Contracts are the specifications of interfaces. A contract of
an interface specifies the functionality of services declared
in the interface, the protocol of the interactions.
A contract is a quadruple Ctr = (I, Init, Spec, Prot) where
(1) I is an interface.
(2) Init specifies the initial state of the design
Init = true ` (init(v′) ∧ ¬wait′)
where v stands for resources of interface I.
(3) Spec maps each service m(in : U, out : V) of interface I
to its specification (αm, gm, Pm)
(4) Prot is a protocol set of valid traces of service activation
events, specifying the interaction pattern between the
contract with its environment, where the event ?m(x)
represents the call of service m with the input x. The
protocol indicates that the contract can provides the
normal response if its services are invoked in the or-
ders included in Prot. Otherwise, the result will be
unpredictable.
Semantics of Contract
The dynamic behaviour of contract Ctr is described by the
triple (Prot(Ctr), Failures(Ctr), Divergences(Ctr)), where
• Prot(Ctr) retrieves the weakest protocol of contract
Ctr.
• Failures(Ctr) is the set of pairs(s, X) where s is a se-
quence of interactions between Ctr and its environ-
ment, and X denotes a set of events ?m and !m in which
the contract may refuse to engage after it has performed
all actions in s.
• Divergences(Ctr) consists a set of the sequences of
interactions between Ctr with its environment which
leads the contract to a divergent state.
Extension of Semantics of Contract
In UML, divergences(Ctr) specifies the interactions in an
use-case which leads the system into a divergent state, in
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which a private service private(m(x)) is invoked infinitely
times. Therefore, the extension of divergences(Ctr) is:
Divergences(Ctr) =df {〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk), ?private(m(x)∗)〉|
(Init; (gm1&Pm1 )[x1, y1/x, y
′]; . . . ;
(gmk−1&Pmk−1 )[xk−1, yk−1/x, y][true, false/ok
′,wait′])
(gmk&Pmk )[xk/x][true, false/ok, ok
′])
In UML, the private service can only be invoked from other
services in the same interface. Therefore, private services
are in the refusal set X of Failures(Ctr), except when the
service mk invokes private service private(m), that means
Failures(Ctr) =df
(〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk−1(xk−1, !mk−1(xk−1))〉, X) |
∃v′ · (Init; . . . ; (gmk−1&Pmk−1 )[xk−1/x])
[true, f alse, true, f alse/ok, wait, ok′, wait′]∧
∀?m ∈ X · ¬gm[v′/v] ∧ ?private(m) ∈ X
∪

(〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk))〉, X) |
∃v′ · (Init; . . . ; (gmk&Pmk )[xk/x])
[true, f alse, true, true/ok, wait, ok′, wait′]∧
∀?m ∈ X · ¬gm[v′/v] ∧ ?private(m) < X

2.3 Contract Consistency
A contract Ctr is consistent, if it will never enter deadlock
states unless its environment violates the protocol, i.e.,
∀tr ∈ Prot ·
 ∃s ∈ traces(Ctr) · s ↓ {?} = tr∧∀(s, X) ∈ failures(Ctr) · s ↓ {?}  tr ⇒
X , {?m, !m | m ∈ MDec}

where traces(Ctr) =df {s | ∃X · (s,X) ∈ failures(Ctr)} and
s ↓ {?} represents the subsequences of s which is formed
by the input events. The notation t  s means sequence t is
the prefix of s.
Extension of Contract Consistency
In the extension, contract is consistent must be both
deadlock-free and livelock-free. That means only if after
any trace, the refusal set X dose not contain all the private
and public services,
X , {?m, !m | m ∈ public(MDec) ∩ private(MDec)}
and the subsequences trace of s does not include infinitely
invoking the private services.
s ↓ {?} , {〈?m∗〉 | ?m ∈ private(MDec)}
2.4 Contract Refinement
Let Ctr = (Ii, Initi, Speci,Proti) (i = 1, 2) are two contracts
with the same set of services. Ctr1 is refined by Ctr2, de-
noted by Ctr1 v Ctr2, if
(1) Divergences(Ctr1) ⊇ Divergences(Ctr2)
(2) Failures(Ctr1) ⊇ Failures(Ctr2)
Extension of Contract Refinement
In UML, the trace of divergence and failures con-
tain the private services invoking. We need hidden
them to keep the refinement definition consistent. Let
Ctr = (Ii, Initi, Speci,Proti) (i = 1, 2) are two contracts with
the same set of public services. PM1 and PM2 re private ser-
vice sets of Ctr1 and Ctr2. Ctr1 is refined by Ctr2, denoted
by Ctr1 v Ctr2, if
(1) Divergences(Ctr1\PM1) ⊇ Divergences(Ctr2\PM2)
(2) Failures(Ctr1\PM1) ⊇ Failures(Ctr2\PM2)
Note that Ctr\PM means hidden the private services in PM
from Ctr.
Above is the brief introduction of service refinement.
In the next section, we will show how service refinement
support for requirements analysis with UML.
3. Requirements Modeling
Online Shopping System [9, 10] is a form of electronic
commerce system which allows consumers to directly buy
products from sellers over the Internet. Consumers can
search interested products through the website, which dis-
plays the same product’s availability and pricing at different
e-retailers. In recent years, customers can shop online using
a range of different computers and devices, including desk-
top computers, laptops, tablet computers and smart phones.
The Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay are the largest companies
providing online shopping services for billions of people all
over the world.
3.1 Use Case Diagram
Fig. 1 UseCase Diagram on Online Shopping System
UML provides use case diagram to help customers
specify the requirements of target system. The basic sce-
narios of shopping online system are specified in Fig. 1:
a) Search Products: The customer can search the desired
products by the keywords, and the system displays the can-
didate products to the customers for further examinations.
b) Shopping Cart: When customers found the desired
products, they can add the products to the shopping cart
if the products are available, e.g., in the stock. The cus-
tomer can also check the state of the shopping cart in any
4
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time, while they find some dislike products in the cart, they
can quickly remove them, and when they like to buy more,
the customer also can change the number of the item in the
shopping car. E.g., there is already one Nike Shoes in Jack’s
shopping car, and Jack likes to buy one more for his daddy,
he could quickly change the number of shoes in the shop-
ping cart.
c) Manage Order: When shopping cart is ready, the cus-
tomer can place the order under his account. That means
the customer must have an account and log into the system.
Moreover, at least one address must be added to their ac-
counts for receiving products. But if the customers have
more than one addresses, the system will ask them to choose
one for the shipment. Once customers logged into the sys-
tem, they can check the state of order at any time, which
will show whether the order is paid or not. Even the cus-
tomer can track their products through the delivery system
once the their products are sent out.
d) Payment : While placing the order, the customers must
choose the payment approach. If they choose cash on de-
livery, the cash must be given to the delivery man when re-
ceiving products. If the customers choose online payment,
the system will check his balance under the account, if the
account has not enough balance to pay, the system must ask
the customers to pay with their credit cards through third
party payment services.
e) Manage Account: If customers are the first time to use
this online shopping system, they must register membership
before checking order out. The customers can modify their
information at any time, which includes delivery addresses
as well as their credit cards information.
3.2 System Interfaces and Domain Concepts Modeling
The primary use cases are presented in the previous section.
In this section, we use the interface of class diagram of UML
to specify the services of use cases in Fig.2.
Fig. 2 Interfaces of Online Shopping System
For example, the interface of ManageAccount contains
the service signup() for the new customer to register mem-
bership, the services login() and logout() for the member
to log into and out the system, editPersonalInformation()
is used for editing the personal information in this system,
checkBalance() is used for checking balance in your account
and deposit() is used for adding the account balance.
The interface can define all the services of the system,
and it even can specify the input and output parameters of
interface and required resource. However, UML lacks the
ability to define the contract for each service precisely. The
formal method, service refinement, not only provides the
approach can precisely define service specification, inter-
face, and contract, but also can verify the consistency and
the refinement of the contracts. For example, the interface
ManageAccount can be described by the interface of service
refinement as follows:
ManageAccountIF def= (RDec, SDec)
SDec = {
signUp(inPersonalInformation : Customer, outR : Boolean),
logIn(inUserName : String, inPasswd : String, outR : Boolean),
logOut(outR : Boolean),
checkBalance(outBalance : Double),
deposit(inNewBalance : Double, outR : Boolean) }
RDec = {
UserDB : Customer∗,
CurrentCustomer : Customer,
TempCustomer : Customer,
LoginState : Boolean}
The signatures of services are defined in SDec. For example,
service login() requires variables username and password
typed String as input variables, returns a variable R typed
Boolean to indicate customer successful login. The required
resource is defined in RDec. In which, the login state of cus-
tomer are represented in variable LoginState with basic type
Boolean. The current customer is represented as variable
CurrentCustomer with the type Customer. This is not a ba-
sic type such as Float, Double, String, Boolean, and Date,
but is a domain concept. This complex type should contain
at least attributes such as Name:String, Passwd:String and
Balance:Double, and it can be represented as a domain con-
ceptual class of UML. Once we define all the interfaces of
the system like above interface ManageAccountIF, we can
forge the domain model by UML conceptual class diagram
in Fig. 3. The conceptual class diagram describes abstract
and meaningful concepts in the problem domain, and it de-
composes the problem regarding individual concepts. This
is an important trophy in requirement analysis. Therefore,
we can tell that service refinement can help UML to get the
more precisely model about the target system in at least re-
quirement election stage.
4. Formal Specifications by Service Refinement
4.1 Service Specification
We have use cases, service interfaces, and domain model
of the target system at this moment. For each service, we
only know the name, but we need to precisely define the
semantics of service, such as when does the service can be
activated, what does the service do but not how to do, by de-
scribing the system state changes carried out by the service.
UML diagrams cannot describe the semantics of service, but
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Fig. 3 Conceptual Class Diagram of Online Shopping
System
service refinement has the triple (αm, gm, Pm), that can spec-
ify the semantics of service. For example, the semantic of
service deposit() can be defined as follow:
Service : deposit(inNewBalance : Double, outR : Boolean)
Specdeposit = (α, g, P)
α = {LoginState, inNewBalance, outR,CurrentCustomer}
g : LoginState = True
p : inNewBalance ≥ 10
R : CurrentCustomer.Balance′ =
CurrentCustomer.Balance + inNewBalance ∧ outR′ = True
The customer can make a deposit into his account through
service deposit(), this service has one input parameter in-
NewBalance, and one output parameter outR. g is a guard
condition describing only when resource LoginState is equal
to True, the service deposit() can be invoked. The design P
main contains precondition p and postcondition R. p de-
scribes that the state of the system before the execution of
the service. R describe the state of system when the exe-
cution service has finished. In the specification of service
deposit(), p describes the minimum deposit amount is at
least 10 dollars. R describes after execution of the service,
the balance of current customer is equal to the origin bal-
ance plus the new deposit account, and the value of variable
ourR is True. All the required resource are defined in α,
which contains variables LoginState, inNewBalance, outR
and CurrentCustomer. Once we specified all the semantics
of services in the interface of Manage Account, we can get
Spec of interface ManageAccountIF:
Spec(ManageAccountIF) = {
SpecsignUp, SpeclogIn, SpeclogOut, SpeccheckBalance, Specdeposit
}
At this moment, the semantics of all services are specified.
However, the interactions between the interfaces of system
and environment (actors) are not described. We will do it in
the next section.
4.2 The Protocol of Interface
Service refinement can specify the interactions in the proto-
col Prot of interface contract. The protocol of interface is a
set of valid event traces of service request and response rep-
resented as 〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk), !mk(yk)〉, where
?m(x) represents a request of service m with parameter x.
!m(y) represents the response of service m with parameters
y. For example, the protocol of ManageAccount interface
is:
Prot(ManageAccountIF) = { s∗ |
s = 〈〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR)〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR),
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
(?deposit(inNewBalance), !deposit(outR))∗,
(?logOut(inNewBalance), !logOut(outR))?〉
Like regular expression, we introduce asterisk * at the right
top of the event indicates zero or more occurrences of the
preceding element and the question mark ? at the right
top of the event indicates zero or one occurrence of the
preceding element. The sequential invoking the services
m1,m2,m3 in the interface I, the trace set is trace(I) =
{〈〉 ∨ 〈m1〉 ∨ 〈m1,m2〉 ∨ 〈m1,m2,m3〉}. The mediate traces
are omit because the limit space of paper, we only show the
initial trace 〈〉 and final trace 〈m1,m2,m3〉 in the following
protocols. The protocol describes three main stories of inter-
face ManageAccount: 1) In the initial state of the interface,
no service is invoked yet, therefore, the trace of interface is
empty. 2) If the users are the new customers, they must re-
quest service signUp() to open accounts in the system. 3) If
they successfully register accounts or already have accounts
in the system, they can call service login() to log in the sys-
tem, check their balance of accounts, deposit into their ac-
counts. Then they may log out of the system.
4.3 System Sequence Diagram for Interface Protocol
The protocol of interface can define the interactions of use
case as above, but it is not easy to understand for the end-
users, even for the developers. UML provides activity di-
agram and system sequence diagram, which can describe
event flow in a clear way. For example, the protocol of Man-
ageAccount represented as system sequence diagram is in
Fig. 4. Like using the question mark ? in the protocol to
describe the optional of the event, system sequence diagram
can take combined fragment opt to describe the same situa-
tion. Combined fragment loop can describes same loop sit-
uation as * asterisk. Furthermore, system sequence diagram
can shows the system interface and the environment actor,
and the request event and response event between actor and
interface. In this point, UML can help service refinement
to describe the protocol of the interface.
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Fig. 4 The Basic Event Flow of ManageAccount
4.4 The Contract of Interface
Until now, we specified the functional requirements in inter-
faces of system I, the specification of services Spec includ-
ing guard condition for activating service, the states of the
system before and after execution of service, and the interac-
tions protocol of interface Prot between the system and the
environment. However, we still lack the information about
the initial state of the interface. In the theory of service re-
finement, the contract of interface specifies the initial state
of the resources. For example, the interface ManageAccount
contains resource in RDec:
ManageAccountIF.RDec = {
UserDB : Customer∗, CurrentCustomer : Customer,
TempCustomer : Customer, LoginState : Boolean
}
The initial operations of those resources are described as:
Init(ManageAccountIF) = True ` (
UserDB′ = CustomerDatabase ∧ CurrentCustomer′ = Null ∧
TempCustomer′ = Null ∧ LoginState′ = False ∧ ¬wait′
)
After system initialization, the resource UserDB contains all
the customers in the database, CurrentCustomer is a refer-
ence initialized as Null, that means this resource is not refer
to any variable. TempCustomer is Null, the boolean variable
LoginState is False. The variable wait is False, which rep-
resents the system in the stable state, and system ready for
receiving service requests from environments. After speci-
fying the initial state of interface, we can derive the contract
of the interface. For example, the contract of interface Man-
ageAccount is specified as:
Ctr(ManageAccount) = (
ManageAccountIF, Init(ManageAccountIF),
Spec(ManageAccountIF), Prot(ManageAccountIF)
)
4.4.1 Failures
The contract of the interface contains the specifications of
resources, services, the initial state of the interface, and pro-
tocol of the interface. However, the protocol only provides
the valid interactions between system and the environment.
We not only need to know what the interfaces of the system
can do but also what they refuse to do. Service refinement
can specify the refusal scenarios by modeling Failures(Ctr)
of the contract. A failure is a pair (s, X) where s is the traces
of interactions between environments and the system, and X
denote the refutation set of the services of the contract af-
ter trace s. Failures(Ctr) is the set of all Ctr failures, which
defined as:
Failures(Ctr) =df
(〈〉, X}) |
∃v′ · Init[true, false, true, false/ok,wait, ok′,wait′] ∧
∀?m ∈ X · ¬gm[v′/v]
∪
This fragment of failure describes the refusal requests of ser-
vices because the guards of service do not hold in the initial
state of interface. For the contract of ManageAccount, the
variable LoginState is equal to False in the initial state. In
Fig.4 of workflow about usecase ManageAccount, the ser-
vices checkBalance(), deposit(), and logOut() can be acti-
vated only if LoginState = True. That means those services
refuse to response environments at the initial state of system
interface. Formally, after initialization with empty trace 〈〉,
the refusal service of interface ManageAccount are:
X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(inNewBalance), ?logOut()}
The next fragment definition of contract failures are:
(〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk), !mk(yk)〉, X) |
∃v′ · (Init; . . . ; (gmk&Pmk )[xk, yk/x, y])
[true, f alse, true, f alse/ok, wait, ok′, wait′]∧
∀?m ∈ X · ¬gm[v′/v]
 ∪
This failure set describes after execution of a sequence re-
quest events, the guards of services became false. The post-
condition of login service shows the variable LoginState’
= True after successfully logging the system. That means
when the customers have already logged in the system, they
can not log in again because the guard condition of login
service cannot be satisfied at this moment. Formally, after
the traces of login service
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〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?login(inUserName, inPasswd), !login(outR)〉
The refusal service are X = {?login(inUserName, inPasswd)}.
After the traces of logout service,
〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?login(inUserName, inPasswd), !login(outR)
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance)
(?deposit(inNewBalance), !deposit(outR))∗
?logOut(), !logOut(outR)〉
the variable LoginState become False. Thus, the refusal ser-
vices are X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(), ?logOut()}.
The next fragment of failures describe for every request
of service, the system must have response to the environ-
ment, even when the service is in the fault. The formal de-
scription is:
(〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk))〉, X) |
∃v′ · (Init; . . . ; (gmk&Pmk )[xk/x])
[true, f alse, true, f alse/ok, wait, ok′, wait′]∧!mk < X
∪
In Fig.4 of the event flow of contract ManageAccount, every
request event of service has a corresponding response event.
Therefore, the system does not refuse to response for any
request.
4.4.2 Deadlock
The next fragment of failures describe the requests of ser-
vices leading the system into a waiting state. The formal
description is:
(〈?m1(x1), !m1(y1), . . . , ?mk(xk))〉, X) |
∃v′ · (Init; . . . ;
(gmk−1&Pmk−1 )[xk−1, yk−1/x, y])[true, f alse/ok
′, wait′];
(gmk&Pmk )[xk/x])[true, f alse, true, true/ok, wait, ok
′, wait′]
 ∪
The deposit service will lead system into a waiting state.
For example, when a customer uses his credit card to add
the balance to his account. The system will wait for the
response from the third-party payment service. Usually, the
system only need to wait seconds before getting the reply of
the payment service, and then set the variable wait to False
after execution the deposit service. However, the third-party
payment service may be ignoring the payment request or
not receive the request because of the fault of the internet
and too many requests beyond his processing ability. If the
requirements are not taken the exception cases into account,
that will lead a deadlock. In that situation, the system will
not give any response to any the request of the services from
the environments. The failure of this case can specify as,
after the execution services of traces
〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?login(inUserName, inPasswd), !login(outR)
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance)
?deposit(inNewBalance)〉
The system refuses to response any requests of public ser-
vices X = {?m | m ∈ public(ManageAccountIF.SDec)}. There
is a terrible property of the system, and we must refine the
contract to the deadlock-free requirements before making
any implementation. The simple idea to handle this situation
is designed an internal service repeatInvolkingPayment() to
periodically such as 30s send the request to the third-party
payment service until it is successfully getting the response.
Note that the repeatInvokingPayment() must be a deadlock-
free service. It has a inside timer to count the waiting time,
once it does not can response from the third-part payment
service till the maximum waiting time, it will force repeat-
InvokingPayment() to return a result. It is the useful strategy
against the fault of the internet such as lost package and de-
nies offer service of the third-party system.
4.4.3 Livelock
The interface in class diagram can also have the ability to
describe the internal service. The services in UML interface
diagram of Fig.2 are public with the prefix mark ”+”, the
internal service is private with the prefix mark ”-”. How-
ever, this internal service will make the system even worse.
When third-party service is dead forever, repeatInvolking-
Payment() service will never stop to send the request. That
will make the system only make this internal service run-
ning forever, but not make any useful response to the en-
vironment. That is so-called livelock of the system, or the
system is in the diverged state. Once the system stuck into
the livelock, the system will refuse to responses from the en-
vironment. That is the last situation specified in the failures
of the contract. Formally, the fragment of failures about di-
vergences of the contract are defined as the set of the pair
{ (s, X) | s ∈ Divergences(Ctr) }. Divergences shows the re-
quest event of service ?mk(xk) will lead system into a unsta-
ble state where ok′ is false. In divergence state, the internal
services are infinitely invoked, that cannot affect system into
a stable state. In our case, the internal service repeatInvolk-
ingPayment() will lead system into a divergences state when
the third-party service is forever unavailable. Formally, the
divergence of interface ManageAccount is:
Divergences(ManageAccountIF) =df
〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?login(inUserName, inPasswd), !login(outR),
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
?deposit(inNewBalance),?repeatInvokingPayment()∗〉 | (Init; . . . ;
(gcheckBalance& PcheckBalance)[outBalance/y][true, false/ok′,wait′])
(gdeposit&Pdeposit)[inNewBalance/x][true, false/ok, ok′])〉
Once we specified divergence of ManageAccountIF, the
last failures fragment of interface manage account are
{(s, public(ManageAccountIF.SDec)) | s ∈ Divergences(Ctr)}.
In the divergence state, the interface ManageAccount will
refuse to response any services of the interface.
In this section, we show how to use service refinement
to specify all possible valid traces from the initial state of
the interface with the refusal service sets. That precisely de-
fines the semantics of the interface. We also see that UML
diagrams can help to give a clue for modeling each case.
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UML diagrams and service refinement are complementary
for each other. Although we get all the possible traces and
refusal sets, that may contain the deadlock and livelock. The
requirements model must meet at least functional correct-
ness with the deadlock-free and livelock-free before imple-
mentation.
5. Refinement and Verification
In this section, we will show how to refine the contracts of
interfacess to the deadlock-free and livelock-free contracts
through theory of service refinement, and use model check-
ing tool to confirm the refinements.
5.1 Contract Refinement
The main refinement strategy is to add more control strate-
gies and resources to make refusal set is a proper subset
of all the services set X ⊂ ManageAccountIF.SDec from
X = ManageAccountIF.SDec. As we mentioned in the pre-
vious section, failures set of contract ManageAccount has
two refusal all service pairs with the traces while execut-
ing of deposit service, first one is in the deadlock state be-
cause the fault of request to the third-party payment ser-
vice, the second one is in the livelock (divergence) state
when the infinitely repeat to request the third-party pay-
ment service by the internal repeatInvokingPayment() ser-
vice. We specify the original contract of ManageAccount
as Ctr1, and the added internal service repeatInvokingPay-
ment() contract as Ctr2. Although contract Ctr2 is deadlock-
free contract, Ctr2 does not refine Ctr1 because they violate
the refinement definition. The contract Ctr2 is more diver-
gence than Ctr1: Divergences(Ctr2) ⊇ Divergences(Ctr1).
We continue to improve the Ctr2 to livelock-free contract
by adding a variable MaxRepeatedTimes typed Integer to
the RDec of interface ManageAccount, and add an control
strategy, that once invoking repeatInvokingPayment() reach
MaxRepeatedTimes times (e.g, 3 times), it will return the re-
sult !deposit(false), and set wait′ as false. At that moment,
the refusal service set X of the contract Ctr3 will not contain
all public services X , public(ManageAccount.SDec) after
the traces:
〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?login(inUserName, inPasswd), !login(outR)
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
?deposit(inNewBalance), ?repeatInvokingPayment()MaxRepeatedTimes,
!deposit(false)〉
After adding the variable MaxRepeatedTimes and maximum
trying strategy to contract Ctr3 of interface ManageAccount,
while request service ?deposit(inNewBalance) service, the
environment eventually receives the response !deposit(outR)
after no more than MaxRepeatedTimes times invoking the
internal service repeatInvokingPayment(). Ctr3 contract will
not make system into a divergence state. Therefore, the con-
tract Ctr3 is a deadlock-free and livelock-free contract, and
Ctr3 refines Ctr1 because after hiding the private service set
PM3 = {repeatInvokingPayment()}, the failures and diver-
gences of Ctr3 and Ctr1 that holds:
(1) Divergences(Ctr1) ⊇ Divergences(Ctr3/PM3)
(2) Failures(Ctr1) ⊇ Failures(Ctr3/PM3)
Furthermore, the contract Ctr3 is a consistency contract, it
will never enter deadlock and livelock states if environment
follows the protocol of the contract. Formally, the Prot of
Ctr3 is:
Prot(Ctr3) = { s∗ |
s = 〈〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR)〉 ∨
s = 〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR),
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
(?deposit(inNewBalance),
?repeatInvokingPayment()0..MaxRepeatedTimes,
!deposit(outR))∗,(?logOut(), !logOut(outR))?〉
The only difference between the protocols of Ctr3 and Ctr1
is in the last fragment Ctr3 contains the request events of
?repeatInvokingPayment()0..MaxRepeatedTimes where the num-
ber 0..MaxRepeatedTimes represents the repeat times of the
event. The Failures of Ctr3 is:
Failures(Ctr3) = {
(〈〉,X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(inNewBalance), ?logOut()),
(〈?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))〉,
X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(inNewBalance), ?logOut(),
?signUp(inPersonalInformation))}),
(〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR)〉,
X = {?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd)}),
(〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR),
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
(?deposit(inNewBalance),
?repeatInvokingPayment()MaxRepeatedTimes,
X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(), ?logOut(),
?repeatInvokingPayment()}),
(〈(?signUp(inPersonalInformation), !signUp(outR))?,
?logIn(inUserName, inPasswd), !logIn(outR),
?checkBalance(), !checkBalance(outBalance),
(?deposit(inNewBalance),
?repeatInvokingPayment()0..MaxRepeatedTimes,
!deposit(outR))∗,(?logOut(inNewBalance), !logOut(outR))?〉,
X = {?checkBalance(), ?deposit(), ?logOut()}),
}
The difference between the failures of Ctr3 and Ctr1 is that
Failures(Ctr3) does not contains the deadlock and livelock
pairs in Failures(Ctr1). Therefore, the contract Ctr3 is con-
sistency contract, which holds:
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(1) ∀tr ∈ Prot(Ctr3) · (∃s ∈ traces(Ctr3) · s ↓ {?} = tr)
(2) ∀tr ∈ Prot ∀(s,X) ∈ failures(Ctr3) · (s ↓ {?}  tr ⇒
X , {?m, !m | m ∈ public(MDec3)) ∪ private(MDec)}
∧s ↓ {?} , {〈?m∗〉 | ?m ∈ private(MDec) }
First condition represents, for every trace of the protocol,
failures have the corresponding specification to describe
the refusal sets of the services requests. Second condition
shows, for every the trace of the protocol, the system must
have at least one service can be invoked, and the subse-
quences trace of s does not include infinitely invoking the
private services. That means the consistency contract must
be deadlock-free and livelock-free.
5.2 Contract Verification
The semantics of service contract is defined by the failure
and divergence models from CSP. To prove the validity of
our work, we model and verify service contracts Ctr1, Ctr2,
and Ctr3 in CSP model checking tool FDR [11]. The verifi-
cation result is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 FDR Verfication
Service contract Ctr1 is divergence-free but not deadlock-
free, because the ?deposit() can make system into a dead-
lock state for waiting the return result from a third-part pay-
ment service, that is presented as an counter example in Fig.
6.
Fig. 6 Deadlock Counter Example of Ctr1
After introducing the private service repeatInvokingPay-
ment() in contract Ctr2, the contract is not longer deadlock-
free, because the service deposit() periodically invoke this
private service repeatInvokingPayment() until successfully
getting the response. However, the contract Ctr2 will stuck
Fig. 7 Divergence Counter Example of Ctr2
in a livelock state because infinitely invoking the repeat-
InvokingPayment() service once the third-part payment ser-
vice is permanently shutdown. This divergence counter ex-
ample is shown in Fig. 7.
To deal with livelock, we introduce a control strategy
with maximum repeat limitation to the private service re-
peatInvokingPayment() as contract Ctr3. Which will make
the system only try MaxRepeatedTime times, then make re-
turn a false result. As shown in Fig. 5, contract Ctr3 is
deadlock-free and livelock-free, and the refinement verifica-
tion result shows contract Ctr3 is a refinement from contract
Ctr1. In short, we get the same verification result from the
model checking tool. That ensure the validity of our work
in this paper.
Note that we did not show the FDR model in this paper,
you can reach it from the GitHub gist†.
6. Related Work
All the related work about service refinement are listed. The
paper [12] proposes a denotational semantical model to ser-
vice orchestration language with the service refinement, and
it can determine whether service orchestration satisfies its
specification. The paper [13] based on service refinement
proposed a formal model for web service interfaces, mis-
matches detecting among multiple web services. The pa-
pers [14,15] propose a formal model to specify and analyze
the behavior and robustness of service mashups under an
unstable environment. The paper [16] present a computable
probabilistic model of the survivable system based on the
service refinement. The paper [17] used service refinement
for providing a mathematical model for WSDL 2.0. The pa-
per [18] proposes a concept of promoting models to obtain
refinements with support from cooperating models. The pa-
pers [19] and [20] are the case studies of this theory but does
not include the contract refinements, and system properties
are checking about divergence, failure, and deadlock. To
best our knowledge, all the related works do not touch the
integrate service refinement with UML requirement analy-
sis to support use case contract refinement and consistent
checking and do not demonstrate the power of UML to help
to elicit the start-up requirements for service refinement.
Other formal methods are also considered to integrate
with UML for system modeling and verification. The paper
[21] motivates an approach to formalizing UML in which
formal specification techniques are used to gain insight into
the semantics of UML notations and diagrams. A small ex-
ample is presented through Z notation to verify whether one
class diagram is a valid deduction of another. Another work
†https://gist.github.com/yylonly
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[22] integrate UML class diagrams and OhCircus by writ-
ten UML elements in terms of OhCircus constructs. UML-
B [23, 24] provides an UML front-end for B methods and
Event-B, which provides a formally precise variant of UML
to support model refinement. The paper [25] provides an
tools for automatically verifying UML model after trans-
forming the active behaviour from UML activity diagram
and class diagram into SMV. In short, the related works fo-
cus on verifying the design model (class diagram) of the
system specified by UML. Our approach make the verifi-
cation more early in the requirements model, because 1) the
problems in requirements model can be passed to the design
model, and 2) to verify a design model, we not only need
to specify a requirements model first but also need efforts to
specify a design model. To be safety and make less efforts,
our approach verified the system in the stage of software en-
gineering process as earlier as possible. This is mainly nov-
elty idea our approach. Note that we only focus on spec-
ifying and verifying the requirements model specified by
UML, which includes use case diagram, interface diagram,
conceptual class diagram and system sequence diagram (ac-
tivity diagram). Other diagram for system design such as
class diagram, sequence diagram (collaboration diagram),
component diagram and state diagram are not included.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Because of the limited space, we only show the contract of
the interface ManageAccount in the paper. Other consis-
tency contracts of interfaces can be specified and then re-
fined in the same approach. This paper shows the both ad-
vantages of UML and service refinement in the procedures
of the requirement analysis. As usual, the developers and
researcher use UML and theory of formal methods like ser-
vice refinement independently. This paper shows how to in-
tegrate each other to do better work. The developers can use
their favourite UML tools along with service refinement to
elicit the consistency requirements with reduced the number
of bugs at the early stage of software engineering. The for-
mal methods researchers can use UML diagrams to elicit the
start-up requirements for next round specifications by their
formal approach. Hopefully, this paper can make an atten-
tion for both the developers and researchers in the software
engineering to do more work on integrating the software en-
gineering industry approach with the formal approach.
This paper only touches the procedures of in require-
ment analysis. We can eventually get the consistency con-
tracts of interface for all the use cases of the system. The
contracts can be further designed and then implemented in
the object-oriented, component-based, and service-oriented
approaches. Furthermore, we consider to integrate the for-
mal approach with our prototype generation tool RMCode
to support agile requirement election and user-level require-
ment validation.
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